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CHAPTER 1

Setting the Stage

It is difficult to make predictions, especially about the future.
— Nobel laureate in physics, Neils Bohr‘

A half century hence, will it be the best of times, the worst of
times—or both? Have we reached the point where our economic system will no
longer change—in effect, the end of history? Or is change accelerating at such
a pace that our economic system in 2050 will be unrecognizable to most of us
today? In the years immediately preceding the beginning of the 21st century, the
acerbic dictum of Neils Bohr in the chapter’s epigraph was ignored and we suf
fered a plethora of predictions, most based on little more than a few random
anecdotes and what the predictor had for breakfast. This book is quite differ
ent—before sketching my views about the future course of the economic sys
tem, I want to look systematically at the most relevant evidence.
The usual platitude to justify studying the future is that it will help us make
plans. More important, however, such an exercise is useful for understanding
what is happening in the present, because it forces us to distinguish transient
from more permanent changes. Thus, in this book I explore such questions as:
What have been the key trends in the U.S. economic system in the second half
of the 20th century and what causes underlay them? If current trends will not con
tinue, what will replace them, and why? At what points do we lack sufficient
knowledge, either theoretical or factual, to make responsible predictions about the
future?
This is not an exercise in prophecy, but rather an attempt to understand the
implications of today’s complicated economic reality. Of course, we can make
forecasts with considerable accuracy in those cases where a well-understood
cause underlies particular systemic changes and where other causal forces do
not intervene. However, we reach the limit of responsible prediction in other

'

Cited by Laura Lee, Bad Predictions: 2000 Years ofthe Best Minds Making the Worst Forecasts (2000).
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cases where several different causal forces impinge on the economic system and
pull it in opposite directions, unless we have good reasons to believe that one set
of causal forces is sufficiently strong to prevail over the others. In still other cases,
all we can do is speak of tendencies.
An example of such an approach is found in my discussion in Chapter 10 of
the implications of the merger wave of the 1980s and 1990s on market competi
tion in the future. I present data showing that such mergers have led to a consid
erable increase in market concentration over the period. Before predicting that
market competition will decline, however, other questions require answers: How
much influence will other relevant factors, such as increased foreign trade or the
rise of buying and selling over the internet, exercise on the future state of compe
tition? How long will this merger wave continue? Will these merged enterprises
prove successful or will they later fall apart into their constituent parts? Both the
data and the theories presented in this chapter allow considerable clarification of
many of these issues, and I argue that there will be a strong tendency toward a
decrease in market competition. Nevertheless, a firm prediction about the future
of market competition is not possible from merger considerations alone. In brief,
we can discuss the future of the economic system in a methodical fashion and set
up direction signs for turning points, even though much of what will actually hap
pen will depend on certain policy decisions that are difficult to predict.
In this chapter I address the following issues in turn: alternative approaches for
analyzing the future; some ways in which alternative forms of capitalism can be
defined; methods by which causes of change in economic systems can be sys
tematically examined and forecast errors can be minimized; and finally, a very
brief preview of the rest of the book.
At this point, I must also point out that this book comes in three quite separate
parts: the discussion in the text; the brief discussion of particular points and the
listing of certain source materials in the appendices contained in this book; and the
more extended analysis of certain ideas and assertions that are contained in the
“external appendices,” which can be found at my specially created website:
www.swarthmore.edu/SocSci/Economics/fpryorl/. The contents of the various
external appendices are listed in the table of contents of this book.

A. Approaching the Topic^

Let me start by saying what this book is not about. It is not about the economy
per se, that is, the way we will live and work and what technology has in store for
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In this section I refer to the following sources: U.S. Commission on National Security (1999),
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us. Rather, it is about the institutions and organizations through which econom
ic activity is channeled. This distinction receives greater attention below. It also
does not concern itself with how the economic system should evolve or how the
economic aspirations of U.S. citizens can best be realized. Rather, it focuses on
changes most likely to occur, regardless of whether they are desirable or not. In
brief, it is an exercise in positive, not normative, economics.
During most of the second half of the 20th century, the changing U.S. economic
system was viewed from the perspective of “capitalism versus communism.” But
after the collapse of the Soviet economy, the question has become more subtle and
more interesting; What kind of capitalism will we have?
Some seem to believe that we have reached the most efficient and stable eco
nomic system possible, that any future change will be relatively unimportant, and
that the subject does not deserve further consideration. But to suppose that economic
history will suddenly cease to be interesting once it has reached the beginning of the
21st century defies our experience of systemic change in the 20th century. In part,
such a view springs from a failure of imagination and an aversion to change.
Some seem to believe that the future is so unknowable that prediction is
worthless. We can only wring our hands in utter frustration and lament along
with the historian Immanuel Wallerstein^:
We have entered a time of troubles. The outcome is uncertain.
We cannot be sure what kind of historical system will replace the
one in which we find ourselves. What we can know with certainty
is that the very peculiar system in which we live, and in which the
states have played a crucial role in supporting the processes of the
endless accumulation of capital, can no longer continue to function.
Such overarching fatalism is inappropriate. Many aspects of economic reali
ty are not subject to random change; they are cumulative and influenced by
causal forces which, to a certain extent, can be analyzed. Moreover, the
economic system—which is the focus of this analysis—usually changes
relatively slowly.
Finally, some seem to believe that the next half-century will bring dramatic
changes to the economic system, so that it will barely be recognizable to those

3

Gallopin, etal. (1997), Halal (1986), Kahn (1979), Rifkin (2000), and Wallerstein (1999, p. 75.)
The intellectual justification for such a position can be quite fancy, resting, for instance, on com
plexity theory that emphasizes the existence of “points of bifurcation” or “qualitative leaps”
when the system veers far from equilibrium. This means that we can neither predict when such
changes will occur nor what the outcome will be and can only rely on airy abstractions such as
“small events can have large effects” while “large events have only small effects.”
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of us who live long enough to see its new incarnation. According to Jeremy
Rifkin, markets will give way to networks and ownership will become less
important. Others foresee that work will become more flexible; organizations
will become more decentralized and organic; and economic scarcity will
become less severe. Moreover, bandwidth will be unlimited; the information
revolution will make us more knowledgeable and perhaps wiser; society will
coalesce again; and the government sphere will drastically shrink. By way of
contrast, I believe that power and wealth will continue to be important in com
ing decades; that economic scarcities will persist and, therefore, so will conflicts
of interest in the allocation of goods and services; and that the dead hands of
history and custom limit possible changes in the economic system.
Because so many past predictions of the future have proven so spectacularly
wrong, in recent years many futurists have turned away from making simple
forecasts. One increasingly common approach is scenario analysis, in which the
future is imagined on the basis of alternative assumptions. What would happen
in the coming decades if population continues to grow exponentially and raw
material scarcities become acute? Or if population stopped growing and materi
al scarcities become less acute? What would happen if the pace of globalization
accelerates, but in a way such that developments are structured by a series of ad
hoc arrangements between governments, rather than the decisive interventions
of some type of future world government? How would these scenarios of the
future be different if human nature were more or less adaptable to particular
forces of change? Some take this approach one step further and envision alter
native future worlds. For instance, in 1986 William Halal foresaw only three
main possibilities of the U.S. economic system in 2000: greater corporate dom
ination, more control over the economy by government bureaucracies, or “dem
ocratic free enterprise.” From an equally broad perspective, the U.S. Commis
sion on National Security/21st Century foresees the world economy in terms of
four possibilities: globalism triumphant; a democratic peace of cooperating but
sovereign nations; nationalist protectionism; or division and mayhem.
Such scenario exercises are extremely useful for contingency planning (by
individuals, business firms, and governments) and for exploring the implications
of certain crucial decisions or changes of a set of crucial parameters of the econ
omy. Some, such as Herman Kahn or Gilberto Gallopin, have provided imagi
native and insightful analyses. Nevertheless, scenarios are not predictions unless
supplemented by additional analysis. That is, we have no assurance about the
probabilities of the various scenarios or whether all of the most likely possible
outcomes are explored. Although such an approach permits a limited number of
concrete possibilities to be taken into account in a vivid and stimulating fashion,
it can obscure underlying (and impersonal) causal forces by placing too much
weight on our ability to change the course of history.
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My approach is different. Because I stress analysis of the causes underlying
various changes, I generally focus on the most likely outcomes. In cases where
counteracting forces are at work, such as an acute scarcity of raw materials
(Chapter 6) or a variety of possible changes in demographic variables (Chapter
2), alternative scenarios must, of course, be specified. Although I often try to
indicate when policy interventions might be helpful, in many cases it does not
seem likely that such measures will be taken, because of the relative strength of
contending political interests. Moreover, in certain cases, such as the slowdown
I predict in future economic growth (Chapter 2), governmental intervention to
ameliorate the problem is limited because the major cause cannot be greatly
influenced by policy, namely a demographic shift resulting in a change in the
ratio of active workers who save and retired people who draw down their sav
ings.

B. Possibilities of Capitalism*

Most studies of the future dealing with economic matters focus on the econ
omy; I focus instead on the economic system. After briefly distinguishing
between the two concepts, I examine a variety of different types of capitalist
systems to show the possible directions that the U.S. economic system might take.

1. The Economy
The economy consists of the myriad activities involved in production, con
sumption, and the distribution of goods and income. Production involves the use
of technology, natural resources, land, labor, and capital, both physical and
human (such as education). Distribution occurs not only through the market but
through gifts, grants, non-market trades and various governmental measures
such as transfers, subsidies, or tax breaks.
Much has been written about the future of the economy. Leaving aside fore
casts about technology (“in 2050, every home will have robots carrying out the
major share of the housework”), several crucial arguments play an important
role in such analyses and it is worthwhile to review briefly three of the most
important and credible propositions (see External Appendix X-1.1 for more
detailed supporting evidence).

In the text of this section I refer to studies by Bell (1973), Esping-Andersen (1990), Pryor
(1996), and Soskice (1999).
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One prediction is called Petty’s “law”: Over the course of economic devel
opment, the labor force shifts away from agriculture toward manufacturing and
thence to services, an hypothesis that receives ample empirical support. Two
serious problems with this approach arise: First, since services are carried out in
all sectors, the share of the labor force in the formal “service sector” depends
upon the degree to which such services are spun off into separate entities. Sec
ond, “services”are undifferentiated and, since various services currently employ
more than three quarters of the labor force, this law is not too helpful for dis
cussing the future.’
Another important prediction, amply supported by evidence for past years, is
that the share of the labor force producing information will increase, while the
share of workers producing goods or homemaking services will decline. In
short, the knowledge industries are gaining in relative importance, a phenome
non obvious to anyone at the end of the 20th century, but not to many a gener
ation ago when pioneering social scientists such as Daniel Bell originally point
ed out this development.
Yet another hypothesis is that the economy will develop a more complex
structure. In this context structural complexity refers to three phenomena: the
information requirements for the system to function; the heterogeneity of deci
sion-making units (for instance, individuals or firms); and the extensiveness of
the interrelations between different sectors of the economy. Elsewhere I devel
op a series of quantitative indicators to demonstrate increasing structural com
plexity of many aspects—but not all—of the economy.
Many other interesting hypotheses have been offered about long-term trends
in the economy. It is, however, not my intention to review them here, because
few have great relevance to the economic system per se. That is, these trends,
like those summarized by Petty’s law or the shift in occupational structure or the
increasing complexity of the economy, have occurred in industrial economies,
regardless of system. They are neither system-determining nor system-deter-

’

Many have tried to repair this second failing. Daniel Bell (1973) suggested dividing services
into three groups: industrial services (transportation and utilities), business services (trade,
finance, insurance, and real estate) and human services (health, education, research and devel
opment, recreation and entertainment, government). A much different approach is to divide the
various industries in the economy according to whether they deal primarily with other busi
nesses (either providing goods or services) or, instead, with consumers (providing goods or
services), either in a business or a non-commercial relationship. This exercise is carried out in
External Appendix X-1.1 and shows that in the U.S., the share of the labor force producing and
moving goods at a distance has considerably declined, while the share of those providing serv
ices to other businesses or consumers has increased, and, finally, the share of those providing
collective services (education, social services, and government) increased up to 1975 and then
leveled off for the next quarter century.
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mined, but, instead, are a function of economic development and technological change.
It is, of course, necessary to give attention to changes in the economy to show
the context of the future economic system. But this is not my primary concern.

2. The Economic System
According to a common formulation, an economic system consists of insti
tutions and organizations. Institutions consist of the rules, laws, and customs
that constrain and guide economic activities. Organizations are groups of indi
viduals working together for at least one common purpose and whose joint
actions have an impact on the allocation of goods and services, for instance, a
corporation or a cooperative. The interaction of institutions and organizations
generates mechanisms that lead to production, distribution, and consumption of
goods and services, for instance, particular kinds of markets or governmental allocations.
While such an abstract approach does not take us very far in predicting the
fate of U.S. capitalism, it does help us frame the topic at hand. It means, for
instance, that in discussing the economic system, we must take into account not
only strictly economic factors but also political and social factors, at least in so
far as they influence economic outcomes.
Capitalism is commonly considered to be an economic system with three
major features: (i) markets serve as the primary means by which goods, servic
es, and factors of production (land, labor, and capital) are allocated; (ii) the
rights of private property are crucial and the owners’ prospect of receiving prof
its serves as a primary incentive for their engaging in economic activities; and
(iii) the direct roles in the economy of collective organizations such as the gov
ernment, the church, or charitable foundations are relatively small. Unfortu
nately, this kind of definition is so general that it obscures the differences
between various kinds of capitalism.
I can illustrate contrasting forms of capitalism by presenting two other ways
of looking at economic systems of industrial nations. The first is a broad
approach, taking into account various combinations of political, social, and eco
nomic factors; the second is a narrower approach that focuses on certain microstructural aspects of the system. In later chapters, I look briefly at still other
major differences in the institutions and organizations of capitalist systems.

3. Capitalist Systems: A Broad Approach
From this perspective economic systems can be defined in terms of
three dimensions:
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One dimension is primarily political—the relative importance of govern
mental participation in the economy through expenditures, regulation, or own
ership of the means of production. Government expenditures include not only
the financing of such traditional functions as diplomacy, internal or external
security, or education but also investment to provide the physical and human
infrastructure of the economy, subsidies to encourage particular types of pro
duction, and transfers of resources from one group to another. Governmental
regulation includes not just micro-economic rules that constrain and guide par
ticular economic activities, but also monetary and fiscal policies that are
designed to stabilize the economy either through the governmental budget or the
central bank.
The second dimension is almost exclusively economic—the extent to which
open and competitive markets influence the economy, in contrast to markets
characterized by oligopoly or monopoly or markets heavily influenced or mod
ified by social or religious constraints.
The third dimension is primarily social—the degree of social solidarity. This
designates not just the extent to which people agree on the basic ground rules
regulating their economic interactions and are able and willing to work cooper
atively on projects of mutual interest, but also the isolation of particular social
groups from each other on the basis of income, race, or some other characteris
tic. The economic implications of social solidarity are manifold and include the
relative importance of charitable giving; the willingness of the population to tax
itself in order to equalize income and life chances; the honesty and efficiency of
the government; and the readiness to resolve economic differences through
negotiation and other social mechanisms that submerge individual interests in
the interests of the entire society. In the following chapters I focus particular
attention on social trust, “social capital,” and inequality, which are three meas
urable manifestations of social solidarity.
These three dimensions of capitalism can be combined, as shown in Chart 1.1.
Such an exercise yields eight different types of economic systems, and it is rel
evant for the rest of my argument to focus brief attention on those in the lower
part of the diagram where the government influence is relatively low.
Americans are most familiar, with the liberal market economy, where social
solidarity is sufficient to insure general agreement on a set of ground rules for
carrying out economic activities, and a generally accepted mechanism is avail
able to enforce them. Although American individualism may seem antithetical
to social solidarity, this social bond is sufficiently strong to allow market trans
actions to occur with a minimum of friction.
If both social solidarity and governmental influence are low, we have anar
chy of the type described by Thomas Hobbes as a war of one against all. Exam
ples of such a system are seen in various types of chaotic economies in the past
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or, to a certain extent, in the Russian economy of the 1990s. The existence of
such economic systems puts in sharp relief the key role social solidarity plays
in liberal capitalism.
In an economic system composed primarily of large corporations with little
competition and with a subservient or accommodating government, we have oli
garchic capitalism. The society and economy are dominated by a relatively
small number of corporate executives with a high degree of political and eco
nomic power. In the following chapters I pay considerable attention to the pos
sibility that the U.S. economic system is moving in this direction.
If social solidarity is high but open economic competition is low, disputes
can be settled through negotiations of capital, labor, and consumer (or govern
mental) interests on an industrial or national level. I designate such an econom
ic system as decentralized corporatism. In the first years after World War II, the
economic systems of both Austria and the Netherlands began to move toward
such a system. In more recent years, however, such national negotiations have
given way to negotiated agreements on the industry level, a phenomenon receiv
ing attention in the next typological exercise.

Chart 1.1. Economic Systems of Industrialized Economies
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In the following chapters I specify particular economic roles of the U.S. gov
ernment that will increase and decrease in importance. Nevertheless, I argue that
the overall governmental influence on the U.S. economy will probably not
greatly increase. For the purposes of this discussion, therefore, it is not relevant
to consider the other four economic systems in the diagram.*
What is important is to determine the direction along each of these axes that
U.S. capitalism has been traveling and whether it is likely to change course. In
the second half of the 20th century the U.S. economic system moved toward
increased governmental influence and, in the last quarter of the century (as
argued in Chapter 7), decreased social solidarity. Key themes of this book are
that, in the coming decades, social solidarity will continue to decline, as well as
market competition, and, as a result, the U.S. economic system will move from
a liberal market economy toward an oligarchic market economy.
While Chart 1.1 provides a useful organizing device, it does not begin to
cover all the different dimensions of capitalism and does not capture certain key
social and political dimensions. For instance, the chart says nothing about the
type of government, so that two types of liberal (in an economic sense) capital
ist systems can be found in the same part of the chart, one with a democratic
government, the other with an authoritarian government that does not greatly
intervene in the economy (for example, the economic system in Chile under
General Augusto Pinochet).
Because of the qualitative nature of the three dimensions, such an approach
also does not readily allow quantitative comparisons between, let us say, differ
ent OECD nations. Nevertheless, it does permit us to organize a qualitative dis
cussion of some major directions in which the U.S. economic systems might
change. Since multiple causal forces are acting on most economic systems, such
a schema also permits us at the end of the book to line up the various forces dis-

«

A situation where both social solidarity and economic competition are low, and where the gov
ernment allocates resources, represents a centrally planned economy. Such an economic system
has both communist and fascist versions, depending on whether property is owned (and profits
are taken) by the government or by private interests.
An economic system where both open economic competition and social solidarity are high,
but where the government plays a major role in redistributing income is the welfare state or a
social market economy.
Two less famihar economic systems can also be specified. A rotating authoritarian, interven
tionist economy occurs in a police state where strong governmental intervention is necessary to
keep certain aspects of the economy functioning and yet open economic competition occurs in
many parts of the economy and the authoritarian leaders are often changed (even, perhaps, by
some type of election), so that different economic interests take control from time to time.
Utopian ^rvialism occurs when both the government influence and social solidarity play key
roles and little open economic competition occurs. This system appears unstable.
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cussed in each chapter in a systematic manner, so that possible directions of
overall change can be established. For instance, if the social glue holding the
economy together dissolves (see Chapter 7), liberal capitalism might be slowly
replaced by Hobbesian anarchy or mafia capitalism. But if other causal forces
are working in other directions and if industrial consolidation continues unabat
ed (Chapters 9 and 10), the U.S. might arrive at oligarchic capitalism. If income
inequalities continue to increase (Chapter 4), the U.S. might be pushed toward
a rotating authoritarian, interventionist economy, if only to maintain domestic
political order. Or a serious ecological crisis that cannot be mastered by market
incentives (Chapter 6) might move the U.S. economic system toward a central
ly planned economy.
In brief, the chart although incomplete provides a useful way of structuring
the discussion so that we can separate and relate the consequences of a large
number of possible causes.

4. Capitalist Systems: A Narrower Economic Perspective
Other ways of looking at various capitalist systems allow more quantitative
comparison. The typology discussed below focuses on more strictly economic
phenomena and uses two dimensions that have been explored by a number of
European economists. Such an approach reveals some major differences
between U.S. capitalism and that of most other OECD nations.
One crucial distinction in the production sphere is the degree to which eco
nomic activities such as labor negotiations, apprentice programs, the setting of
standards, allocation of credit, or even research are carried out either at the com
pany level, the industrial level (for instance, by trade associations) or at the
national level (by various types of joint committees of representatives from
industry, labor, and government). If the government plays primarily a coordi
nating role, such supra-enterprise activities represent a type of corporatism (in
Chart 1.1) David Soskice presents evidence that such supra-enterprise coordi
nation also has an important impact on those lines of production in which the
nation has a comparative advantage.
A second crucial distinction is the type of governmental participation in the
economy. In a particularly insightful analysis of the relation between citizen and
state, Gpsta Esping-Andersen distinguishes two contrasting approaches toward
governmental welfare expenditures. Some governments base their welfare trans
fers on the principle that all individuals have an entitlement to the same mone
tary amount, a system I label “universal welfare system.” For instance, all might
receive roughly the same old age pension, independent on what they had previ
ously contributed to the pension system. Other nations tailor such transfers to

THE FUTURE OF U.S. CAPITALISM
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Table 1.1. Types of Capitalist Systems in Early 1990s
Universal
welfare systems

Particularistic
welfare systems

High coordination
of productive
activities above
the enterprise level

Austria, Australia, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden

Italy, Japan, Switzerland

Low coordination
of production
activities above
the enterprise level

New Zealand, U.K.

Canada, U.S.

Note: For the distribution of nations according to their welfare system I use the evaluations of
Esping-Andersen (1990), who defines this ranking in terms of “decommodification of labor.” For
coordination I use an unweighted average of scales of “centralization” and “coordination” by the
OECD (1997-a, p. 71), scaling the pluses or minuses as an eighth of a point. The OECD shows
(p.73) that their rankings are quite similar to those of nine other studies. The rankings by Soskice
(1999), which are based on the degree of interlocking directorates of large enterprises in the vari
ous countries, are also quite similar.

individuals on the basis of either their economic need (defined by some govemmentally established standards) or their previous work; I label this approach
a “particularistic welfare system.”
Table 1.1 combines these criteria and places various OECD nations in the
appropriate quadrants. The results show that the institutions and organizations
of U.S. and Canadian economic systems are quite different from those of other
OECD nations. While this kind of typology is highly suggestive, we must avoid
two possible errors of interpretation.
• No simple one-to-one relationship exists between the types of capitalist
system shown in Table 1.1 and various indicators of economic performance. For
instance, the type of welfare system and the cdordination above the level of the
enterprise are not significantly related to the growth of per capita GDP, other
possible causal factors held constant.’ Contrary to expectations, the inequality
of family income is not significantly related to the type of welfare system,
although it is inversely related to coordination of production above the enter
prise level, other factors held constant. Such results do not mean that the eco-

’>

In these regression experiments the explanatory variables were the per capita GDP, the ratio of
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nomic system defined according to these criteria has little influence on eco
nomic performance, but rather that we must proceed with caution.
Given that no single type of capitalist system clearly outperforms the others,
there is also little reason to believe that various types of capitalist systems will
converge toward a common model along these characteristics.' This result also
means that U.S. capitalism is not necessarily superior or inferior to these other
economic systems.
• The placement of economies along the two dimensions of the typology
cannot be easily tied to other features of their society. For instance, my experi
ments to use results from the World Value Study to determine if such data would
predict the placement of various nations in Table 1.1 were totally unsuccessful.’
That should come as no surprise because the economic system of a particular
nation is the outcome of a complex mix of historical, economic, political, and
social factors that do not easily lend themselves to such a simplistic approach.
Of course, many other typologies of capitalism can be constructed, depend
ing on the purpose of the discussion. For instance, I draw on quantitative analy
ses of the relative importance of government expenditures, regulation, and own
ership from industrialized OECD nations to construct Table 13.1. This analysis
shows—not unexpectedly—that the U.S., the U.K., Japan, and Switzerland are
the nations where the government plays the smallest role in economic life along
all three dimensions.
To provide perspective on U.S. capitalism, I carry out in this book a number
of comparisons between various industrialized OECD nations. In almost all
cases the U.S. appears almost alone at one extreme, and the results in
Table 1.1 preview these findings. Such exercises provide evidence from the
economic sphere of “American exceptionalism,” a theme that in
tellectuals and scholars from various disciplines have been exploring for the
last several centuries.”

‘
’

trade to GDP, the logarithm of the population, and the system variable, all for 1995. The vari
ables to be explained included were per capita GDP growth from 1985 to 1995 and a measure
(Gini coefficient) of family income inequality, corrected for size of family.
Freeman (2000) carried out a useful empirical analysis of such lack of convergence in the area
of labor-market institutions.
Using national data from Inglehart, Basanez and Moreno (1998), 1 carried out several statistical
experiments using factor analysis. None of the derived dimensions revealed any correlation of
rankings with the countries in Thble 1.1. Simple correlation of various value scales did, however,
yield some surprising results. For instance, scales for three values composing the alleged
“protestant ethic” namely thrift (Variable 232), hard work (V-228), and entrepreneurship (V323), yielded quite different rankings of the various OECD nations.
Almost three hundred years ago travelers and scholars began to remark on the difference
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Given that the U.S. economic system has had a much different past than that
of most other industrialized nations, and that its present configuration of insti
tutions and organizations is also special, it seems likely that the future U.S. eco
nomic system should also be unique. Even the economic systems of Canada and
the U.S., which appear in the same quadrant in Table 1.1, operate quite differ
ently in other ways, so that their future economic systems will probably diverge
as well.
As a result of American exceptionalism, we cannot learn about the future of
U.S. capitalism by looking at the future of capitalism in general. Obviously,
changes in other capitalist nations will influence developments in the U.S. Nev
ertheless, for better or worse, the fate of the U.S. economic system will be spe
cial, a function of its unique past and present.

C. Change in Advanced Capitalist Systems"
As noted above, I reject the view that U.S. capitalism will not greatly change.
I also reject the hypothesis that change in the U.S. economy and economic sys
tem is accelerating and will continue on this rising path in the coming decades.
The arguments underlying these assertions are presented in External Appendix X-1.2.
In analyzing how economic systems change, neoclassical economists would
argue that we should follow the great Victorian economist Alfred Marshall,
whose watchword was the Latin aphorism “nature does not take leaps.” As a
result, he focused on incremental or marginal changes in institutions, economic
organizations, and economic variables. But according to the recent theory of
punctuated equilibrium, we must employ a slightly different watchword, name
ly “nature only occasionally take leaps.” I might also add that from a long his
torical perspective some of these leaps in economic institutions and systems

between the old and new worlds. By the 19th century remarks about “American exceptionalism”
usually included the key notion of the lack of a feudal tradition in the new world, for instance,
a poem by Goethe (1988 (1825?)) (“America, you have it better than this old continent. You have
no crumbling castles and fallen battlements. And in these present times you have no blight, of
useless memories or senseless fights....”). The most careful and lengthy assessment is by deTocqueville (1969 (1835)). In the 20th century this intellectual tradition continued with the useful
studies by Louis Harzt (1955) and Seymour Martin Lipset (1996). In the narrower field of eco
nomics, books by Michel Albert (1993) or Charles Hampden-lbmer and Alfons Trompenaars
(1993) provide interesting insights. Contrary to the impression gained from Table 1.1, there are
also significant differences in the economic system of Canada and the U.S., as argued by Lipset
(1996, Chapter 3; and Card and Freeman (1993)
" In this section I refer to my research published in Pryor (2000-c).
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appear to be only short hops or pirouettes; witness, the rapid rise and similarly
speedy fall of fascism in the 1930s and 1940s or of centrally planned socialist
systems in Eastern Europe from the late 1940s to 1990.
Because economic systems usually change more by evolution than by revo
lution, structural discontinuities do not often occur and, moreover, they are
notoriously difficult to predict. Sometimes such structural changes result from
the outcome of political struggle. In other cases the underlying cause is techno
logical change, and in the future, the advances in biotechnology, genetics, or in
nano-technology might have such an impact. In the coming decades, climatic
change or acute scarcities of key raw materials such as oil might also result in a
structural leap of the economic system. Finally, for certain institutions and
organizations, changes in government economic policies might also have such
an effect.
In some cases in later chapters, I try to indicate where such structural dis
continuities might arise, even though they may be impossible to foresee or, in
many cases (for instance, where technology is involved), to imagine. Neverthe
less, both to avoid taking too many flights of speculative fancy based merely on
subjective hunches and to stay close to the available empirical evidence, I base
my argument on the assumption that such structural wildcards will not have an
enormous influence on the future evolution of American capitalism in the next
half century.
Further discussion of my analytic techniques for studying the future of U.S.
capitalism does not seem necessary at this point. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile
to mention briefly certain techniques that I avoid. For the most part I eschew sys
tematic scenario analysis, because the number of permutations and combinations
are endless and tax both the patience and the memory of the reader. I also avoid
placing too much emphasis on single causes—a favorite device of those writing
science fiction or sketching utopias and dystopias, because, in most cases, many
causal factors influence outcomes (often in opposite directions). Finally, I do not
find it necessary to employ highly technical econometric forecasting techniques,
primarily because the critical parameters underlying institutional and systemic
change do not easily lend themselves to such an analysis.
In brief, I am trying to analyze the most probable future of the economic sys
tem on the basis of the best information currently available, not on the entire
range of possible changes that the economic system might experience. I focus
more on the petits pas, rather than any possible and unpredictable grand jete,
that the economic system might take. To keep the analysis orderly, I also
separate the immediate causes of systemic change into two basic sets: internal
and external.
Internal forces are immediately related to the economy and include global
ization, gradual changes in technology such as the relative fall in communica-
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tion costs), shifts in the demographic structure, or policy blunders by the gov
ernment. I argue in External Appendix X-1.3 that the latter were a major cause
of the collapse of the Soviet economic system. Dysfunctional operations of
major economic institutions or organizations also serve as an important impetus
for change. For instance, the relatively poor economic performance of the U.K.
from 1950 through 1980 played an important role in encouraging new political
forces to move the economic system from one of the most statist economies in
Western Europe in the early 1960s to one of the least by the end of the century
(see Chapter 13). Economic events which are politically intolerable represent
another internal cause of change. For instance, in the U.S. many governmental
regulations on banks in the 1990s originated in the 1930s as a direct response to
the bank failures during the Great Depression.
External forces include changes in the ecological, social, and political cir
cumstances, trends discussed in Chapters 6 through 8. Ecological changes
include raw material scarcities or increasing pollution and global warming.
Changes in the political environment not closely related to the economy include
those attributable to wars, shifting ideologies and attitudes toward government,
and evolving configurations of civil society. Some of these external causes of
systemic change are difficult to predict, while others lend themselves to sys
tematic analysis. A major purpose of my discussion is to sort through the possi
ble external forces acting upon the system to determine which permit responsi
ble forecasting.
Such a focus on immediate causes of change to the economic system should
not, of course, blind us to the fact that the ultimate causes may be different. For
instance, the ultimate cause of a change in the external environment, such as
pollution or global warming, might be unregulated economic activities; and the
ultimate cause of a change in the income distribution might be political or
social. Nevertheless, the distinction between immediate external and internal
causes of change allows us to go about the analysis of specific causes in a rela
tively simple fashion, without having to solve the deep problems of ultimate
causation.
Although economic systems can mutate into quite different forms in a slow
and evolutionary fashion, few people are conscious of these major structural
changes. This lack of awareness stems in part from the complexity of the sys
tem, especially since it is difficult to measure and understand these structural
elements. Indeed, many of these changes represent abstractions far removed
from most aspects of normal daily life. This lack of awareness is also due to the
passage of time and the isolation of one generation from the experience of
another—grandchildren usually have little knowledge of the concrete circum
stances of how their grandparents lived. My purpose is to increase awareness of
such systemic changes.
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D. Approaches toward Prediction”
My approach toward prediction—and, more modestly, the specification of
tendencies—is influenced by the dismal track record of futurology. I then draw
certain brief lessons from these shortcomings.

1. Lessons from the Past
At the 1892/93 World’s Fair in Chicago, some eminent Americans were
asked to make their predictions about the U.S. a century hence. These short
essays, published in a book by Dave Walter, make amusing reading. A series of
radio broadcasts in the late 1960s asked another select group to make their pre
dictions about what the U.S. would be like in 2000. These broadcasts, published
in a book by Irving A. Falk, evoke a similar reaction. How could the forecasts
have been so mistaken?
Some of the errors are elemental. Many forecasters confused the world as it
should be with the world as it actually will be. Many confused a “possibility”
with a “high probability,” and let their fantasies run amok, paying little attention
to the close connection between past and future. Finally, many disregarded Tal
leyrand’s ardent exhortation that we must, above all, avoid enthusiasm. Thus,
we have intelligent public personalities like Hubert H. Humphery predicting in
the late 1960s that by 2000 we will be living on the floor of the ocean, utilizing
tides as energy sources; scientists will have virtually eliminated bacterial and
viral diseases; robots will be used for everyday work; we will speak a universal
language; we will control the weather; and commercial transport will be carried
out by ballistic missiles.
The record of prophecies concerned with technology and science is similar
ly disappointing. In a fascinating book Steven Schnaars presents a catalogue of
prediction errors made in the 20th century by alleged experts.” He examines, for
instance, a well-known set of forecasts made by two highly regarded futurists,
Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener, for the year 2000 and shows that only
about 25 percent of their predictions were realized. Even when more people are
drawn into these exercises in prediction, the record of success is not much bet
ter. For instance, when Industrial Research surveyed 1,433 scientists and engi
neers in 1968 about the predictions in the Kahn-Wiener list, they proved grossly

”

13

In this section I refer to studies by Anon. (1920), Anon (1968), Bell (1973), (1976),Gordon and
Helmer (1964), Humphrey (in Falk (1970)), Kahn and Wiener (1967), Schnaars (1989), and
Walter (1992), and Wise (1976).
George Wise’s (1976) study of predictive success is also useful, even though it is much less
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optimistic; slightly less than one third of the major technological
breakthroughs that they expected to occur between 1975 and 2000 actually
came about.
The margin of forecast error depends, of course, on the subject ot the pre
dictions and the period for which the predictions are made. From an interesting
set of predictions made in 1920 in Scientific American, I calculate that roughly
65 percent were actually realized by 1950. But most of these predictions are
banal—^for instance, that a bridge would be built where the Golden Gate bridge
now stands in San Francisco. In 1958 the RAND Corporation carried out a more
ambitious study, utilizing a Delphi technique (a structured interaction between
the predictors) and an all-star cast of scientists. According to my calculations,
only about 25 percent of the predictions made about advances m the pure sci
ences or in space exploration by the year 2000 were actually realized.'* One
unnamed participant noted in the Appendix of this study: “I believe that one
overwhelming breakthrough ... is imminent in the field of behavioral sciences.
It will be a realization that we cannot successfully predict the [technological]
future because its nature depends on discoveries as yet unmade and inventions
as yet uninvented.”
Accurately forecasting the impact of such technological changes is no easi
er. George Wise looked at the predicted social, political, or economic effects of
particular technological changes and found incredible blunders, for instance, the
forecast in 1900 that automobile usage would never take hold. Only 25 percent
of all these predictions of effects came true, a result to give pause to those con
fidently discussing the impact of e-commerce (see Chapter 10) on competition.
In the political and economic field such prediction errors are, of course,
legion. Before World War II, few predicted the fall of the colonial system. After
the war, few foresaw the rise of militant Islam. In the economic field, few fore
saw the energy crisis, the dramatic economic success of South Korea and Tai
wan, or the rise and fall (and rise again?) of Japanese industry. Accurate pre
diction of the long-term behavior of certain economic variables such as
population or GDP has also proven elusive. For instance, writing in 1967 Kahn
and Wiener predicted that in the year 2000, the U.S. population would be 318.4

plete than Schnaar’s. I find it depressing that it is outsiders, rather than those m the forecasting
mainstream, who carry out research on prediction errors. For instance, the various conUibutors
to the anniversary issue of Technological Forecasting and Social Clumge, 62, No. 1 and 2
(August/September/1999) were so busy congratulating themselves that none womed about
whether the enterprise in which they were engaged had any validity.
1* If any additional proof is needed about the weaknesses of the Delphi technique for forecasting,
it can be found in an essay by Tashakori, et al. (1988). They used this methodology to predict
that between 1988 and 2000 there would be a significant decline in individualism in Amenca.
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million, when it actually turned out to be closer to 275 million. It is noteworthy
that about half of the U.S. population in 2000 was alive in 1967, which means
that their prediction error appears even worse than at first sight.
Perhaps the worst record of prediction is in the social realm, particularly by
those who have the strongest faith in “progress” of the perfectability of
humankind. But many of these “forecasts” are too casual to deserve analysis.
Many false prophecies are, of course, random guesses based on little evi
dence other than hunches and anecdotes. In this regard we must keep in mind
the observation attributed to Cato the Elder, “I wonder that a soothsayer doesn’t
laugh when he sees another soothsayer.’”’ Cicero adds, “For how many things
predicted by them really come true? If any do come true, then what reasons can
be advanced why the agreement of the events with the prophecy may not be due
to chance.”
Other wrong predictions are due to an insufficient appreciation of the ran
domness of events and margins for error. In making their population forecast
Kahn and Wiener were surely aware of the considerable fluctuations over time
in birth rates and the fact that birth rates in the middle 1960s, when they made
their forecast, were relatively high. They chose, for reasons unknown, to believe
that the situation in the 1960s would last at least for the next three decades.
An even deeper and more subtle forecasting error in these studies arises
because the predictor focuses attention on causal relationships that are true only
if all other causal factors are held constant and, as a result, does not examine the
behavior of these other causal factors. For instance, many have argued that the
retirement age will fall without taking into account that our longer life expectan
cy means that more accumulated savings are needed to finance retirement.
Fortunately, the future of social and economic structures appears easier to
predict than particular events or variables, in large part because structures usu
ally change only slowly and, in many cases, the causal variables are clearer. A
well-known example is the work of Daniel Bell on changes in contemporary
capitalism and the coming post-industrial society. Starting with ideas about the
shift of the labor force to services and to knowledge-intensive occupations, he
argues a number of propositions that have subsequently become commonplace,
for instance, that post-industrial society will be organized around knowledge (of
which a central element is theoretical knowledge), that education will more and
more be the key to social mobility and economic advancement, and that power
will be defined increasingly in terms of institutional position, rather than just
personal wealth. He also argued that as the economy shifts more to services,
labor unions will lose power and membership. From such an approach he made

’’

Cited by Cicero (1926, p. 429).
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a number of startling and insightful predictions which I draw upon in later chapters.
Nevertheless, events have shown Bell to be overly optimistic about the pace
of change and totally wrong about major aspects of the economic system. For
instance, he argued:
A post-industrial society ... is increasingly a communal society
wherein public mechanisms rather than the market become the allo
cators of goods, and public choice, rather than individual demand,
becomes the arbiter of services. A communal society by its very
nature multiplies the definition or rights—the rights of children, of
students, of the poor, of minorities—and translates them into claims
of the community. The rise of externalities ... turns clean air, clean
water, and mass transit into public issues and increases the need for
social regulation and controls. The demand for higher education and
better health expands greatly the role of government as funder and
setter of standards. The need for amenities, the cry for a better qual
ity of life, brings government into the areas of environment, recre
ation, and culture.
Perhaps Bell confused what ought to occur, losing sight of political and eco
nomic feasibility.'* Or perhaps people are less rational than Bell had assumed.
Or perhaps Bell was simply extrapolating from a few decades in the past and did
not realize that around the middle 1970s, trends in both government regulations
and expenditures would sharply change.

2. My Approach
From the mistakes of others, I draw five short but important lessons:
First, I make a conscious effort not to confuse how I want the economy to
evolve with how it actually will evolve. I find disheartening many of the changes
I foresee.
Second, forecasting the future requires a careful study of the past and pres
ent. For this reason I spend considerable effort not just trying to unearth current
trends but also to determine their causes and to ask whether these causal forces
can be expected to operate in the future.

In a recent book Robert J. Samuelson (1995) develops these points made by Bell and then
argues that we can’t afford the taxes to pay for such entitlements, so that a cutback in govern
mental expenditures is necessary. For my own views on trends in public expenditures, see
Chapter 12.
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Third, I rely much more on statistics than on anecdotes. Much of the analy
sis of the economic system and its evolution must, by necessity, be statistical,
because this is the only way in which the aggregative impact of many different
events can be evaluated. I try, however, to present the data in a fashion that they
can be readily understood and to illustrate what they mean through relatively
concrete examples. For the specialists or those wishing further proof, I place the
technical details of these calculations and most of the sources in a series of
appendices.
Fourth, I try from the very beginning of the analysis to take into account the
uncertainties surrounding any forecasts. Sometimes this means presenting a
range of estimates or heavily qualifying my conclusions to take particular con
tingencies into account.
Fifth, at a certain point in all speculations about the future, it becomes impos
sible to make any kind of responsible forecast. We may not understand exactly
what is happening in the present; the underlying data for making the forecasts
may not be very good; or too many causal factors may enter the picture and it
may not be clear which is strongest. Some phenomena which could greatly
influence the future of capitalism, for instance, the rise of the internet, might be
still too new to understand all of their implications. Or, the government, church
es, or other agencies might step in to solve certain problems if key people come
to recognize the difficulty and believe they can help to solve it. In brief, because
we are not all-knowing nor passive witnesses to our fate, the future is, to a cer
tain extent, indeterminate. In many instances in the following discussion, I sim
ply note that we have reached the limits of responsible prediction and move to
another topic.

E. Plan of Attack"
In Chapters 2 through 5,1 look at four of the most important internal causes
of change of the economic system. These include slower economic growth,
because of the adverse impact of demographic changes on saving; increasing
fragility of the economy particularly in the financial sphere; adverse changes in
the inequality of income; and trends toward international economic integration
(globalization) and a possible future backlash against this trend. In some major
respects my evaluation of these factors differs considerably from the majority
view of the economics profession, at least as recorded in the recent “Millenni
um Survey.”
In this section the Millennium Survey among economists is by Pryor (2000-b) and reference is
also made to public opinion studies of the Pew Research Center (Pew, 1999).
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In Chapters 6 through 8,1 examine some important external forces of change
of U.S. capitalism. These include the impact of changes in the physical envi
ronment, as well as social, and political changes. In contrast with many wellknown futurists, I argue that a deteriorating physical environment or raw mate
rial scarcities will probably have a minor impact on the economic system (even
though it may have a major effect on the economy), while, by way of contrast,
declining social cohesiveness will play a crucial role in the future economic sys
tem. The discussion of political factors focuses not just on wars and revolutions,
but on more subtle phenomena, such as declining trust toward government,
which will, in turn, influence the future economic role of the government.
The next four chapters focus directly on the emerging new economic institu
tions and organizations. Chapters 9 and 10 deal with changes in the structure of
the private sector, particularly regarding the size of enterprises and the degree of
industrial concentration in individual markets. In contrast to the conventional
wisdom, I present evidence that the new information technologies are leading to
larger, not smaller, enterprises and that market competition is decreasing as
well. In Chapters 11 and 12,1 discuss changes in governmental intervention in
the economy, particularly regarding public regulation of production, the extent
of public ownership, and public expenditures. Despite the weakening of certain
governmental policy making tools and a decline in government regulation, in
part due to globalization, I argue that the role of government in other aspects of
the economy, particularly public expenditures, will increase in importance.
Although I focus most analytic attention on the government and the private
profit-making sectors, the U.S. economic system has a number of other institu
tional and organizational complexes that require attention if we are to gain a
fuller view of how the entire system will evolve. These complexes include home
production, the underground economy, and the nonprofit and cooperative sec
tors. These receive brief attention in Chapters 7, 8, and 11 respectively.
Chapter 13 provides an overview. In certain instances, the analyses in partic
ular chapters point to changes in the opposite direction, so it is necessary to
assess which set of forces is stronger. I also turn back to the diagram in this
chapter and argue that it is most likely that U.S. capitalism will move toward an
oligarchic market economy, rather than remaining as it currently is, or moving
either toward corporatism or a social market economy. Undoubtedly, my own
subjective biases influence how much I weigh the various forces in play, but
readers can, if they wish, make their own estimates from the raw materials that
I present.
To keep the book readable, I try to minimize footnotes and bunch the refer
ences at the beginning of each section by author and date. Those wishing fuller
citations can then consult the bibliography. The appendices contain notes on the
statistical sources and methods of estimation. They also present short essays on
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specialized topics mentioned in the text that some may feel deserve further elu
cidation but that are not of direct relevance to the main discussion.
In brief, I try to provide a guidebook to understand the changes that might
befall U.S. capitalism, to specify the indicators by which they can be observed,
and to assess some of their major economic impacts. Three warnings are, how
ever, necessary: If you are looking for a set of easy-to-read, airy speculations
about our economic future that are stated with absolute certainty and are based
on a set of piquant anecdotes, my advice is to turn either to astrologers or to
social science fiction. If you are looking for policy prescriptions, either to has
ten the advent of a particular new economic system or to preserve the old, you
will likewise be disappointed: my primary purpose is to diagnose, not to pre
scribe. In economics as in medicine, however, diagnosis is necessary before the
proper remedies can be considered. Finally, if you wish confirmation or positive
feedback to the hyper-optimism about the future of U.S. capitalism revealed in
surveys of general public opinion surveys, this book is not for you. Although it
is not my intention to make pessimism fashionable among economists again, I
show that the U.S. economic system faces some very serious problems in the
coming decades.

